Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Lorrie Ann Arnold v. Dr. Glade B. Curtis : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elliott J. Williams; Williams & Hunt; attorney for appellee.
Anthony M. Thurber; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Arnold v. Curtis, No. 910146.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3472

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTA.«

UTAH SUPREME COURT

UOOL.TV'M.II i

KFU

BRIEE

45.9

qtOiyh

,S9

©0CKET NO. m

i

IN AMD FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE! OF UTAH
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
C a s n M. - , •Mill 46

DR. GLADE B. CURTIS,
Defendant/Appellee
BRIEF
Appea

MI l o i i Ly No,

18

APPELLANT

:

oiu uraer or summary Judgment Entered By
Third Judicial District Court
Honorable Leslie A. I iewis, District Court Judge Presiding

Elliott J. Williams
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-4567

Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

AI Mi nt"/ mi /'ippt/iioe

Attorney for Appellant

,w

to***

JUL 1 9 1991
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

IN AND FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 910146
DR. GLADE B. CURTIS,
Defendant/Appellee

Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From Order of Summary Judgment Entered By
Third Judicial District Court
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court Judge Presiding

Elliott J. Williams
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-4567

Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorney for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

6

POINT I

6

POINT II

6

POINT III

7

ARGUMENT

7

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT
OF AN OBSTETRICAL SPECIALIST, DR. KENNETH MCHENRY
AS UNTIMELY WHEN THE DOCUMENT WAS FILED AS AN
OPPOSING AFFIDAVIT IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARING DATE... 7

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS,
DR. DONALD HOUSTON WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY
REGARDING THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVITS
OF EITHER OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES ON
THE BASIS OF LATE DESIGNATION OF THE WITNESSES
CONCLUSION

14

22
24

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES-'
CASED

ui-fED

Anton v, Thomas, 806 ?.. 2o 7 VJ. y]-c-.r. '•-^ . iiy.
Atlas Corr:
-J,-:7is N^7^0iidx Bank,
7 2"" ?.. 2d 2 25, 22 9 (Utah 19 87)
Butterf iei«

. ^_^A

.

Quean y. Jones, f: i - , 2 : . -

(Utah ;?sn,.

Gaw v. State Dept, of Transp,,
79 3 P . ::d II °n . 17 34 (Utah App, 1990 )
Reed v. Reed,
P. 2d
, 1ri4 Utah

11

-<
, _-, --, -.*-, *->, ^4

i i i

I i
i < ii !

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt, v. Blomquist,
773 P. 2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 19P.S)
7

•"-" ^ Lake C I L V lorp. v. James Constructors, Inc. ,
: P. 2d 4 2 (Utah Ann. 1 Q 8 ^

WaJA^iiiicrsi: v . Keslei , ?2 ij*,an cLlf
"

3

t

P id 6 5-; ^19 37,

• : v. Richfield Citv . ~" u :•-..:•-«- ••

-

Wester:: Capital & Securities \, . AHULIS-, I.,J ,
768 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1989). .
STATUTES
P P C t .j.. ,\

'

i'" A

1953, as amende''

. .*

OTHLn. MUI'HORITTZ AND REFERENCES
Moore ? s Federal Rules Comments , Rule 56 (c "l
Rule —" - • vL

.

.Laauro

Ru-i --.ul L, ,.;.. ku-.es or Judicial Administration
Rule 5c(c) Federal R1*' *

. i-iduj «« , , , , . . . .

9
! , H, 9
»4
9

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court to hear
this appeal by Section 78-2-2(j), U.C.A. 1953, as amended ("orders,
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(a) Appellant
reversible

error

contends
by

failing

that
to

the

lower

consider

court

the

appellant's expert witness Dr. Kenneth McHenry.

committed

affidavit

of

The lower court

determined as a matter of law that the opposing affidavit of Dr.
McHenry was served beyond the time limitation provided by Rule 4501, U.R.J.A.; whereas service of the affidavit satisfied the
service requirements for affidavits opposing summary judgment as
provided by Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.. [Record at 00160-166 (Conclusions
of Law), addendum "A"]
A lower court's interpretation of a statute or rule presents
a question of law. The reviewing court accords conclusions of law
no particular deference, but review those interpretations for
correctness.

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 665 (Utah 1990)

(b) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling
that the opposing affidavit of appellant's other expert witness,
Dr. Donald Houston, was insufficient because it did not specifically state that he as a general surgeon was familiar with the
standard of care applicable to the appellee as an obstetrician.
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in the consideration of motions for summary judgment, and were
induced by an erroneous view of the law.
In determining whether the trial court properly granted
summary judgment as a matter of law, no deference is given by the
appellate court to the trial courtfs view of the law; which is
itself reviewed for correctness.

Reed v. Reed,

P.2d

, 154

Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (1991); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989);
Bank, 737 P.2d
considered

225, 229

clearly

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National

(Utah 1987).

erroneous

if

they

Findings of fact are
are

without

adequate

evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view
of the law. Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989
(Utah App. 1989).
(c) Appellant contends that the trial court's exclusion of
an expert witness affidavit on the basis of late designation of the
witness as an expert was an abuse of discretion. It is appellant's
position that affidavits opposing summary judgment are in the
nature of rebuttal testimony, and that rebuttal witnesses are not
required to be designated in advance. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d
1239 (Utah 1980) the exclusion of undesignated expert's testimony
which was likewise in the nature of rebuttal effectively precluded
appellant from presenting her case to a jury on its merits, and the
exclusion was held to be erroneous.
3

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative of
the issue concerning timeliness of opposing affidavits, which
according to that rule may be served no later than the "day prior"
to the time fixed for hearing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the Case

This is an action for medical malpractice alleging appellee's
failure to timely diagnose an adenocarcinoma of the bowel during
the course of routine prenatal care.
b.

Course of Proceedings

This action was commenced in February, 1989.

On June 18,

1990, the District Court, Judge Raymond S. Uno presiding, held a
scheduling conference with both counsel of record appearing.

It

was verbally agreed by the parties1 counsel that designation of
witnesses was to be accomplished by October 31, 1990, and that
discovery was to be completed by December 31, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, defendant filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment supported by an affidavit from defendant's expert witness,
Dr. Gary H. Johnson.

Counsel for defendant thereafter verbally

agreed to extend the time for plaintiff's
31, 1991.

4

response until December

On December 31, 1990, plaintiff responded to defendant's
motion by serving a memorandum and opposing affidavit from expert
witness Dr. Donald Houston,

On January 7, 1991, defendant filed

a reply memorandum contending that plaintiff's response failed to
raise any genuine issue of material fact with the affidavit of Dr.
Houston

for

the

reason

that

Dr. Houston, a medical

doctor

specializing in general surgery, could not comment on the standard
of care applicable to the defendant, a medical doctor specializing
in obstetrics.

In response to that contention, plaintiff on

January 29, 1991, filed and served another opposing affidavit from
a board certified obstetrical specialist, Dr. Kenneth McHenry.
On January 29, 1991, defendant filed a Motion to Strike the
affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry on grounds that he had not been
designated as a witness before October 31, 1990, and that the
affidavit was untimely because it was filed beyond the time allowed
by Rule 4-501 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
c.

Disposition in the Lower Court

On February 22, 1991, a hearing on defendant's motions was
held before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, District Court judge.
The trial court judge refused to consider either the opposing
affidavit of Dr. Houston or Dr. McHenry; the former for the reason
that Dr. Houston was not an obstetrical specialist and the latter
as being untimely served.

The court thereupon determined that
5

without opposing affidavit testimony there was no opposition to the
affidavit of the defendant's expert, Dr. Gary Johnson; and that in
the absence of opposing expert testimony, summary judgment of
dismissal was appropriate.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The above Statement of the Case contains an account of the
facts relevant to this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT L
r.^pollant

contends

that

the opposing

affidavit

of

her

obstetrical expert, Dr. Kenneth McHenry, was timely filed according
to the provisions of Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
That rule provides ff[T]he adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits*11

Since the McHenry affidavit was

served January 29, 1991, and the hearing was held nearly one month
later on February 22, 1991, the trial court erred as a matter of
law in determining that the affidavit of Dr. McHenry was untimely
and could not be considered in the summary judgment proceeding.
POINT II.
Appellant contends that the nature of the alleged malpractice
is such as to be within the knowledge and experience of any medical
practitioner whether a specialist or not; and that the trial court
erred in refusing to accept or consider the affidavit testimony of

6

Dr.-Houston on the grounds that as a general surgeon he could not
comment upon the standard of care applicable to appellee as an
obstetrician even in a matter of general medicine not involving
obstetrics.
POINT III.
Although written designation of Drs. Houston and McHenry as
expert witnesses occurred after the date of the parties' in-court
verbal agreement for identification of such witnesses, the trial
court manifestly erred by imposing a sanction for late designation
ir- the form of an absolute exclusion of both Dr. Houston's and Dr.
McHenry!s affidavits; both of which were submitted to the court by
way of rebuttal, and within the time permitted by the rule
applicable to summary judgment motions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVIT
OF AN OBSTETRICAL SPECIALIST, DR. KENNETH MCHENRY
AS UNTIMELY WHEN THE DOCUMENT WAS FILED AS AN
OPPOSING AFFIDAVIT IN ADVANCE OF THE HEARING DATE
Appellee argues that the affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry was
properly excluded by the trial court on the basis of untimely
service thereof, and appellant's failure to designate that witness
earlier according to the trial court's "directive".

Appellant

maintains that the subject affidavit was timely served according
7

to the provisions of Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P., as amended, and that the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding the affidavit
contrary

to

the

rule

or

as an apparent

sanction

for

late

designation of Dr. McHenry as a witness.
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in
summary judgment proceedings "[T]he adverse party prior to the day
of hearing may serve opposing affidavits."

Appellee argues that

this provision must be read in concert with the preceding sentence
which states that "The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing."

Appellee's argument

suggests that only when a motion for summary judgment is served
within

10 days of the time fixed for hearing may opposing

affidavits be served prior to the day of hearing.1

Appellee's

argument is misplaced since the clear language of Rule 56(c)
requires that motions for summary judgment shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for hearing.

Motions for summary

judgment cannot be served within that 10 day period.

Any such

untimely motion would be a nullity subject to a motion to strike,
and would require no response by the service of opposing affidavits
or otherwise. The appellee's argument asks the court to accept the
illogical notion that only where a motion for summary judgment is

Record at 00137-00142
8

served in violation of the rule (i.e., within 10 days of the time
fixed for hearing) may opposing affidavits be served not later than
the day prior to the hearing under Rule 56(c).

In other words,

appellee's argument is that if the motion is properly served( i.e.,
more than 10 days before the time fixed for hearing) Rule 56(c) is
meaningless.

There is no other or better interpretation to be

given the rule than that affidavits opposing a motion for summary
judgment may be served no later than the day prior to the time
fixed for hearing.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules is analogous to Rule 56,
U.R.C.P.2.

Both clearly provide that opposing affidavits to be

considered by the court may be served no later than the day before
the hearing.

In the federal context, it has been commented that

Rule 56(c) should be read in conjunction with Rule 6(d), which
provides that for motions in general, opposing affidavits may be
served not later than one (1) day before the hearing, and which
also vests in the court the power to permit opposing affidavits "to
be served at some other time."3 In this case, it is clear that the
opposing affidavit of Dr. Kenneth McHenry was timely served

d

Reed v. Reed,
P. 2d ^ , 154 Utah Adv.Rep 6, 8 (Utah
1991) (Since the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were patterned after
the federal rules, this court may examine federal decisions to
determine the meaning of the rules)
3

Moore's Federal Rules Comments, Rule 56(c).
9

according to the provisions of Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. and the recent
holding in Butterfield v. Qkubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah App. 1990).
It is clear from the rule's plain language and applicable case
law that in Utah affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment
may be served at any time prior to the day of the hearing. In this
case, plaintiff filed and served the affidavit of Dr. McHenry on
January 29, 1991, several weeks before the hearing was scheduled.
In Butterfield v. Qkubo, 790 P. 2d 94 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah
Court of Appeals considered the matter of timeliness in filing
opposing affidavits under Rule 56(c), and stated:
[A]xiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the
court; it must also be served on opposing counsel no
later than the day before the hearing on the motion, • ..
(Emphasis added)(footnote omitted)
Appellee further argues that the exclusion of the McHenry
affidavit was appropriate since appellant had not designated Dr.
McHenry as a witness according to the lower court's "scheduling
order."

In excepting to the lower court's apparent sanction of

excluding opposing or rebuttal affidavit testimony, appellant
directs this court's attention to the recent case of Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); wherein the Utah Supreme Court
identified at least three factors which compelled its decision to
reverse a district court's similar exclusion. All three of those
factors appear to be present in this case. The Dugan court
10

described them as follows:
"First, the court's [scheduling] order was never reduced
to writingAlthough this court is not aware of an
explicit statutory requirement that pretrial orders in
this state be written, the practice is encouraged. ...
Second, the matter was tried before the court without a
jury. ... Third, the court could have used means other
than exclusion to sanction [the party] for their noncompliance with the order, including imposing costs
incurred by the other parties in obtaining experts." Id.
at 1244 (citation omitted)
Appellee argues that the 1987 amended version of Rule 16,
providing additional sanctions which may be imposed under Rule 37,
were not available to the Dugan trial court when it excluded expert
testimony.

The 1987 amendment to Rule 16 does not supercede or

invalidate the Dugan decision for the reason that even if the Dugan
trial court had the alternative of imposing other sanctions now
available under Rule 37, it cannot now be said that the court would
have imposed them instead. Appellee's argument speculates concerning what the trial court would have done in 1980 with alternatives
made available by the 1987 amendments. Such speculation of course
has no place in this court's deliberations.

Nevertheless, the

sanction imposed by the lower court in Dugan of excluding expert
testimony was found to be improper and an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.

Although the Dugan trial court did not have

available to it the alternative Rule 37 sanctions allowed under
Rule 16, it did impose a sanction which is now available under Rule

11

37, and that was considered by the Utah Supreme to be an abuse of
discretion.

In Dugan, as here, the exclusion of expert testimony

which is in the nature of rebuttal effectively prevented appellant
from proving her case.
Since the McHenry affidavit was served January 29, 1991, and
the hearing was held nearly one month later on February 22, 1991,
the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the
affidavit of Dr. McHenry was untimely, both by reason of the dates
of service and designation; and that it could not therefore be
considered in the summary judgment proceeding.
There is no requirement in the rules or elsewhere that
affidavits opposing summary judgment motions may only be from
witnesses who have been previously designated. Opposing affidavits
are in the nature of rebuttal testimony, and to disallow an
opposing affidavit for lack of prior designation would be tantamount to refusing to allow a rebuttal witness to testify because
he had not been designated previously.

Rebuttal witnesses need

never be designated before they are called to testify.

The trial

court committed manifest error in failing to consider the affidavit
of Dr. McHenry for that reason.
It

is

apparent

that

the

trial

court

interpreted

the

Butterfield decision to mean something other than it says regarding
the serving of affidavits.

There is no other conclusion to be

12

drawn from the decision than that opposing affidavits may be served
no later than the day before the hearing. Plaintiff satisfied that
requirement by serving the opposing affidavit several weeks before
the hearing.

There is no requirement in the rules or elsewhere

that opposing affidavits must be filed at the same time as opposing
memoranda.

In this case, the questioned affidavit was obviously

crucial to the summary judgment issue at hand.

The Trial Court

itself indicated that if the Dr. McHenry affidavit was considered
it could "arguably rise to the level of defeating defendant's
motion for summary judgment."

[Record at 00158, pg 20] Exclusion

of that affidavit therefore produced the summary judgment.
In Utah, a lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
law are considered "clearly erroneous" if they are without adequate
evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view
of the law.4

Appellant maintains that the Lower court erred in

determining that appellant's late designation of witnesses somehow
violated an earlier scheduling "order" of the court. Specifically,
the lower court found that there existed a scheduling "order"
[Record at 00160-166, paragraph 4, addendum "A"], as where no such
order had in fact ever been served upon the parties as is reflected
by its unexecuted mailing certificate [Record at 00045-00046,

Western Capital & Securities v. Knudsviq, 768 P.2d 989,
991 (Utah App. 1989).
13

addendum "B"].

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that

the scheduling "order" precluded the designation of appellantfs
expert witnesses when it occurred. [Record at 00160-166, para* 5,
addendum

"A"].

The trial court further concluded

that the

affidavit of Dr. McHenry could not be considered because it was not
timely served under the provisions of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules
of Judicial Administration [Record at 00160-166, para* 5, addendum
"A"].
The

lower

court's

findings and conclusions

are

clearly

erroneous in both respects since no scheduling "order" was ever
served upon the parties, and Rule 4-501 does not control the filing
of affidavits in opposition to motions for summary judgment under
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P..

Those facts standing alone, and when

considered under the

"clearly erroneous" standard of review,

justify reversal and remand.
POINT II*
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFFfS EXPERT WITNESS,
DR. DONALD HOUSTON WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY
REGARDING THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE
REQUIRED OF THE DEFENDANT
The

trial

court

determined

that

appellant

failed

to

demonstrate that Dr. Houston, as a medical doctor specializing in
general surgery, was knowledgeable and competent to testify

14

concerning the standard of care applicable to an obstetrical
specialist; and that appellant had therefore failed to raise any
issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, determined that the
affidavit of appelleefs expert witness, Dr. David H. Johnson,
stated that "the care the defendant provided complied with the
standards

of

care

observed

and

followed

by

specialists

in

obstetrics and gynecology,•.•", when in fact the actual language
of the affidavit contains no such statement. [Record at 00160-166,
para. 7, addendum

"A"].

The affidavit of Dr. Johnson, who

specializes in both obstetrics/gynecology and oncology, does not
state what the trial court found to be a fact and used as a basis
for granting summary judgment.

The affidavit actually states

[Record at 00062-00084, para. 8, addendum "C"]:
"...it is my opinion that the medical care and treatment
rendered by Dr. Glade B. Curtis to Lorrie Ann Arnold
complied in all respects with the standards of
professional care, learning, skill and treatment
ordinarily possessed and used by practitioners in good
standing in this and similar communities in 1986.
(emphasis added)
It is obvious that the trial court construed the quoted
affidavit statement to mean that the care rendered by the appellee
to the appellant complied in all respects with the standards
applicable to obstetricians, when in fact the affidavit refers only
to the standards applicable to "practitioners".
15

Since Dr. Johnson

has more than one specialty, the standard of care to which he
refers may be that common to any one of his several specialties.
By its interpretation of the affidavit contents, the trial court
construed the term "practitioners" to include obstetricians; while
the term in its common meaning actually applies to physicians in
all

specialties

practice.

including

surgery,

obstetrics,

and

general

Although the affidavit contains language to the effect

that the obstetrical care rendered appellant was appropriate,
appellant maintains that the recognition and diagnosis of rectal
cancer is not something peculiar to the practice of obstetrics; but
is rather within the realm of general medical practice common to
all practitioners. The obstetrical care rendered appellant is not
in controversy.

The appellant's claim is that appellee failed to

timely diagnose an adenocarcinoma of the bowel.

Recognizing and

dealing with rectal cancer does not particularly involve the
activities of an obstetrician, or any other specialist.

The

condition is one which should be recognized and dealt with by any
competent medical practitioner regardless of his specialty.
There is no suggestion from any source that the standard of
care in diagnosing rectal cancer is peculiar to the specialized
practice of obstetrics. Dr. Johnson's affidavit merely states that
he is "familiar with the standards of appropriate medical practice
involved in the evaluation and treatment of patients presenting for
16

prenatal care and the development, as in this case, of colorectal
cancer". The affidavit does not state what the appropriate medical
practice iss.

In view of the fact that Dr. Johnson has more than

one specialty, and that one of those specialties

(oncology)

involves the specialized diagnosis and treatment of tumors, he is
undoubtedly

familiar

with

the higher

standards

of

a

cancer

specialist.

As applied to this case, the statement is ambiguous

since it can be read as relating to either the practice of
obstetrics or oncology.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
analyzes the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the losing party.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis

Nat 1 ! Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). In this case, the trial
court incorrectly drew an inference against the appellant which was
that Dr. Johnson had addressed

the standard

of

care of an

obstetrician, when in fact the standard of care he described was
that

for

medical

"practitioners"

and

not

for

obstetricians

specifically. Appellee has extensively argued the need for expert
testimony from the specific medical specialty involved, but has
not provided

any

testimony which particularly

applicable standard of care for an obstetrician.

describes

the

It is only Dr.

McHenry's affidavit that specifically addresses the standards
applicable to an obstetrician.

Under Utah law, all inferences
17

which can be drawn from the affidavit of Dr. Johnson must be viewed
in a light most favorable to the appellant. From the fact that Dr.
Johnson has more than one specialty and is therefore familiar with
more than one standard of care, it is reasonable to infer that his
failure to specifically state that his evaluation of the case was
based upon the standard of care for an "obstetrician" means that
his statement relates to the standards in one of his other
specialties. In any case, the appellant is under Utah law entitled
to all reasonable inferences, or in other words the "benefit of the
doubt" where summary judgment is involved.
In this case expert medical testimony is required to establish
the

standard

of

care, departure

proximately caused injury.

from

the

that

in a

and

a

The question is by what standard of

care the appellee's conduct is to be measured.
position

standard,

It is appellantfs

case such as this issues of diagnosis,

treatment, or referral to another physician; matters common to all
practicing medical doctors regardless whether they practice a
specialty.

Testimony in such cases from another physician who

happens to practice in the same specialty is not required, but the
testimony of any competent medical doctor familiar with the
standards of care applicable to all medical doctors, whether
specialists or not, should be sufficient.

An example to consider

may be the recognition of cardio-pulmonary arrest, a life18

threatening condition which any competent physician should be able
to recognize and address, regardless of his specialty.
At the very least, the trial court could and should have
allowed plaintiff to provide foundational testimony to that effect
if the court had any doubt concerning the competence of a physician
specializing in surgery to comment upon the standards applicable
to another physician specializing in obstetrics where the diagnosis
of rectal carcinomas common to all practitioners is involved.
There is nothing in the record which suggests that the recognition
of rectal carcinomas is something peculiar to the practice of
obstetrics.
In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's ruling which allowed
the testimony of a medical doctor concerning the standard of care
in an action against a chiropractor, since it was shown that the
chiropractor "stepped out of the 'chiropractic field1 and into the
field of medicine." By an extension of that reasoning, a specialist faced with signs and symptoms of disease, the recognition of
which is common to the general practice of medicine, should at
least be held to the minimum standards of care applicable to all
practicing medical doctors, specialist and generalists as well.
For

example,

if

the

appellant

presented

to

an

obstetrical

specialist with obvious signs and symptoms of a severed artery or
19

a compound fracture of the arm which the specialist failed to
recognize or act upon, the patient should not be required to
establish the specialist's departure from the applicable standard
through testimony of another obstetrician, since those conditions
do not involve specialized knowledge or expertise but rather
disorders within the common knowledge of all medical practitioners.
Any medical doctor, whether a specialist or general practitioner,
who has obtained a basic medical education and holds himself out
as a practitioner should be held to the same standard of care in
the diagnosis of common disorders. While the specialist may
develop greater knowledge and skill in some particular area or
areas, he remains first and foremost a medical doctor who should
be held to the same standards as all medical doctors where such
common disorders are involved.
In this case, the trial court committed manifest error by
determining as a matter of law that the standard of care by which
the appellee's conduct is to be measured is a standard which is
unique to his specialty, which can only be described by another
specialist in the same field; and again by disregarding the only
available evidence specifically dealing with the standards of a
specialist.

The trial court further erred by inferring that Dr.

Johnson's affidavit addressed the standard of care applicable to
"obstetricians" when it did not say so, and only because obstetrics
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happened to be one of Dr. Johnson's several specialties.
The trial court erred

in requiring that the applicable

standard of care for the recognition and diagnosis of that disorder
must be established only by the testimony of another physician in
the same specialty; and erred again in refusing to consider a
specialist's

opposing

affidavit

which

clearly

defines

the

applicable standard of care and the appellee's departure from it.
The medical issue in this case involves such basic, general,
medical knowledge and practice as to which any competent medical
doctor, whether a specialist or not, should be competent to
testify.

Dr. Houston has provided such testimony as a medical

practitioner specializing in general surgery. If a specialist from
the same specialty does testify as has Dr. McHenry, his testimony
should at least be considered.

If considered, either or both of

those physicians' affidavits must at least be considered to raise
issues of fact which preclude summary judgment.
In order for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion
for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not
necessary for that party to prove its legal theory; it is only
necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts controverting the
facts stated in the moving party's affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988).
the appellant has done by serving the opposing affidavits.
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This
If

either or both were considered by the District Court as required
by law, or if the inference drawn was against the movant as
required by law, summary judgment of dismissal would be improper.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO ACCEPT OR CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVITS
OF EITHER OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES ON
THE BASIS OF LATE DESIGNATION OF THE WITNESSES
Appellant does not dispute that written designation of Dr.
Donald Houston as an expert witness occurred after the date of the
partiesf in-court verbal agreement regarding designation of such
witnesses.

Dr. Houston had however been identified earlier in

answers to interrogatories, and his participation as an expert
witness certainly came as no surprise to the appellee.
court

manifestly

erred

by

imposing

a

sanction

The trial
for

"late

designation" in the form of an outright exclusion of Dr. Houston's
affidavit testimony.

Appelleefs argument that there in fact

existed a "scheduling order" has only arisen on this appeal.
Appellee's Motion to Strike filed in the lower court [Record at
00124-00127] addressed the requirement of filing a designation of
witnesses. Appellee's motion was not accompanied by the scheduling
"order" because no such "order" had ever been served upon the
parties.

Since no such "order" was ever served, it was error to

consider non-compliance with its deadlines as justifying summary
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judgment of dismissal.

That is however what the trial courtfs

action has effectively done.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), reversing a trial court's ruling which
excluded expert testimony on a damage issue.

The relevant facts

in Dugan are nearly identical to those presented here.

In that

case, a pretrial conference was held at which it was verbally
agreed that experts were to be identified by a certain time.
Neither party submitted a formal pretrial order, nor did the court
prepare one itself.

During trial, the trial court excluded the

testimony of an expert witness for failure to identify the witness
in accordance with the pretrial verbal agreement.
As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court significantly
described at least three factors which compelled its decision to
reverse because of the exclusion.

All three of those factors

appear to be present in this case:
"First, the court's order was never reduced to writing.
Although this court is not aware of an explicit statutory
requirement that pretrial orders in this state be
written, the practice is encouraged. ... Second, the
matter was tried before the court without a jury. .. .
Third, the court could have used means other than
exclusion to sanction [the party] for their noncompliance
with the order, including imposing costs incurred by the
other parties in obtaining experts."
Id. at 1244
(citation omitted)
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In Dugan, as here, the effect of the trial court's exclusion
of the expert's testimony appeared in the trial judge's finding
that "there is no competent evidence introduced from which the
Court could find [in favor of the plaintiff]."

According to the

authority of Dugan, the trial court in the present case committed
manifest error by excluding in its entirety the testimony of expert
witnesses in opposing affidavits as a sanction for belated, or even
no designation.

If any sanction were appropriate, it should be

something less than the outright dismissal which resulted from the
trial

court's

election

to

totally

disregard

all

opposing

affidavits.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's
grant of summary judgment of dismissal represents manifest error
which should be corrected by reversal and remand.
DATED this M

h

day of July, 1991.

ANTHONY^/ THURBER
~
Attorney top: ApnellanJ^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on this

day of July, 1991, I

mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to the following:
Elliott J. Williams
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-4567
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ADDENDUM # 1

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS - A3483
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678

MAR 1 8 1991
\. C-juiy Cor

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

V.

DR. GLADE B. CURTIS,
Civil No. 890900890-CV
Defendant.
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Dr. Glade B.
Curtis came on regularly for hearing on the 22nd day of February,
1991, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding.

Anthony M.

Thurber, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff Lorie Ann Arnold.
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. appeared on behalf of defendant Dr.
Glade B. Curtis.
The Court having reviewed the pleadings and records on file
herein, having heard oral argument of counsel and being fully
advised in the premises, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This is a medical malpractice action in which the

plaintiff alleges that she has sustained loss, injury and damage
EXHIBIT "D"

as a consequence of an alleged failure of the defendant to make a
timely diagnosis of an adenocarcinoma of the bowel.
2.

The defendant is a medical doctor who is a specialist in

obstetrics and gynecology.

Dr. Curtis began providing

obstetrical care to the plaintiff in September 1986, and
continued as her obstetrician until her pregnancy was terminated
in January 19 87.
3.

The plaintiff commenced this action in February 1989,

and on April 23, 1990 certified the case as ready for trial
representing that all discovery had been completed.
4. On June 18, 1990, the Court, Judge Raymond s. Uno
presiding, held a scheduling conference with both counsel of
record in attendance.

With the concurrence of counsel, the Court

ordered designation of all witnesses by October 31, 1990, and
completion of additional discovery by December 31, 1990. The
trial of the case was scheduled to begin on March 5, 1991.
5.

No motions have been made at any time to request a

change in the Courtfs scheduling Order or a continuance of the
trial.
6.

On October 31, 1990, the defendant filed and served his

designation of witnesses which identified, among others, Gary H.
Johnson, M.D., as an expert witness.

Although plaintiff in

Answers to Interrogatories previously identified Don Houston,
M.D. as a potential expert witness, no designation of witnesses
was filed as ordered by the Court.
2

7.

On October 5, 1990, defendant filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment supported by the Affidavit of Gary H. Johnson, M.D., a
specialist in obstetrics and gynecology and in gynecologic
oncology. JCn Dr. Johnson1s opinion, as stated in his affidavit,
the care the defendant provided complied with the standards of
care observed and followed by specialists in obstetrics and
gynecology and, in any event, an earlier diagnosis of the
adenocarcinoma would not have changed the outcome.
8.

On December 31, 1990, the plaintiff responded to the

defendants motion with the Affidavit of Don Houston, M.D., who
is a specialist in general surgery.

Dr. Houston stated that he

is familiar with the standards of care "utilized by medical
practitioners," but his affidavit is devoid of any assertion that
he is familiar with the standards of care of a specialist in
obstetrics and gynecology or that such standards are identical to
those standards with which he is familiar.
9.

On January 7, 1991, the defendant filed his Reply

Memorandum arguing that Dr. Houston's affidavit failed to
establish a sufficient foundation of knowledge about the
standards of care applicable to an obstetrician/gynecologist to
permit his opinion to create a genuine dispute as to any material
fact.
10.

On January 29, 1991, in response to the defendant's

Reply Memorandum, plaintiff filed an "Additional Witness
Designation" identifying, for the first time, Dr. Kenneth
3

McHenry, an obstetrician/gynecologist, as an expert witness-

On

that date the plaintiff also filed an affidavit from Dr. McHenry,
The defendant moved to strike the affidavit due to the
plaintiff's untimely designation of the witness and untimely
submission of his affidavit.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff in a

medical malpractice action is ordinarily required to provide
competent expert testimony to establish that the defendant
deviated from the applicable standard of care and that the
departure from standard proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries.

Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980).

The

issues presented in this case are clearly beyond the knowledge of
laymen and thus expert testimony is required.
2.

The standard of care by which the defendant's conduct is

to be measured in this action is the standard of care observed
and followed by physicians practicing the specialty of obstetrics
and gynecology.

Practitioners of other specialties would not

ordinarily be competent to testify as experts on the standard of
care applicable to this case.
(Utah 1985).

Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P. 2d 245

An exception would be allowed if the party offering

a witness establishes that the witness in another specialty is
knowledgeable about the standard of care of an
4

obstetrician/gynecologist with respect to the matters at issue
and that the standards of the different specialties on those
issues are the same.

Martin v. Mott, 744 P. 2d 337, 339 (Utah

App. 1897).
3.

The defendant has provided competent expert testimony

from Gary H. Johnson, M.D., that the care and treatment the
plaintiff received from the defendant complied with applicable
standards of care and that an earlier diagnosis of the
adenocarcinoma would not have altered the plaintiff's outcome.
4.

The plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient

foundation to demonstrate that Dr. Don Houston, a general
surgeon, is knowledgeable and competent to testify about the
standard of care of an obstetrician/gynecologist with respect to
the matters at issue in this case.

Consequently, the affidavit

of Dr. Houston fails to raise a material issue of fact as to
whether the defendant's care was appropriate or whether the
plaintiff sustained any injury as a consequence of any delay in
diagnosis.

Burton v. Youngblood, supra; Martin v. Mott, supra;

Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1987).
5.

The plaintiff's designation of Dr. McHenry as an expert

witness is untimely as it was made long after the deadline
imposed by the Court's scheduling Order.
extend that deadline.

No motion was made to

The plaintiff also failed to comply with

Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration in filing
the affidavit of Dr. McHenry after the deadline for responding to
5

the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment had expired.

For

these reasons, the Court will not consider the affidavit of Dr.
McHenry and consequently it will not preclude the imposition of
summary judgment.
6.

Summerhays v. Holm, 468 P.2d 366 (Utah 1970).

On the state of the record there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and defendant Dr. Glade B. Curtis is
entitled to judgment in his favor and against plaintiff Lorrie
Ann Arnold, no cause of action.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law the Court now enters the following:
JUDGMENT
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Glade B. Curtis
be, and the same is, hereby granted and judgment is hereby
entered in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff, no cause
of action.
DATED this / I)

day of March, 1991.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS, being duly sworn, says that he is
counsel for defendant herein; that he served the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in Case No.
890900890-CV, before the Salt Lake County District Court, upon
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Attorney for Plaintiff:
Anthony M. Thurber
Judge Building, Suite 735
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 7th day of March, 1991,

ELLIOTT' J. WILLIAMS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7th day of March,
1991.

annENDUM # 2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD, LORRIE ANN
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NCTICE
-VSCASE NO.

890900890 CV

CURTIS, GLADE B DR
HONORABLE RAYMOND S UNO
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON JUNE 18, 1990
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AMD MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON MARCH 5, 1991 AT 10:00 A..M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 04 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR JURY TRIAL. COUNSEL ARE TO
SUBMIT AN AGREED SET OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COURT BY
FEBRUARY 4, 1991. OBJECTED TO INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED
SEPARATELY.
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
DECEMBER 31, 1990
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY JANUARY 18, 1991
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
OCTOBER 31, 1990
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
FEBRUARY
4, 1991 AT 9:00 A .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AMD WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $10,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PERPARE AN
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT.
DATED THIS 18TH DAY OF JUNE ,x*l 9 9 0 .

LS
r

JU^^

-frr^if^

K&0"
.£. 4-&

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON THE
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.
(;t

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ATTACHED SCHEDULING ORDER AND TRIAL NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,
POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE FOLLOWING:

THUR3ER, ANTHONY M.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
3 EAST BROADWAY
SUITE 735
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84111

DATED THIS

WILLIAMS, ELLIOTT J.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
10 EXCHANGE PLACE,
ELEVENTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84145

DAY OF
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DEPUTY CLERK
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ADDENDUM

ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
ELIZABETH KING (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LORRIE ANN ARNOLD,

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY H. JOHNSON,
M.D.

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

890900890-CV

DR. GLADE B. CURTIS,
Judge Raymond S. Uno
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

GARY H. JOHNSON, M.D. being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

My name is Gary H. Johnson, M.D. and the information

contained in this Affidavit is true and is based on my personal
knowledge.
2.

That I am a medical doctor with a specialty in

Obstetrics/Gynecology and Oncology.

I am licensed to practice

medicine in the State of Utah, with my offices located in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

EXHIBIT "A"

3.

That I was involved in the practice of medicine in

obstetrics and gynecology in the State of Utah during 1986, the
time in question in the Complaint of Lorrie Ann Arnold,
4.

That I am familiar with the standards of professional

care, learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and used
by obstetricians in this and similar communities in 1986.
Specifically, I am familiar with the standards of appropriate
medical practice involved in the evaluation and treatment of
patients presenting for prenatal care and the development, as in
this case, of colorectal cancer.
5.

That I have been board certified by the American Board

of Obstetrics/Gynecology.

My education and training are outlined

in my curriculum vitae attached hereto.
6.

That my opinions set forth in this Affidavit are based

upon my review of:

7.

(a)

The Complaint filed in this matter; and

(b)

The medical records of Lorrie Ann Arnold.

That the medical records set forth above in paragraph

6(b) are the type of records generally relied upon by physicians
in their day-to-day practice to determine the history, care and
treatment of patients.
8.

That from my total review of the medical records and

other information received, and based upon my experience and
expertise as an obstetrician and as an oncologist, it is my
opinion that the medical care and treatment rendered by Dr. Glade
-2-

B. Curtis to Lorrie Ann Arnold complied in all respects with the
standards of professional care, learning, skill and treatment
ordinarily possessed and used by practitioners in good standing
in this and similar communities in 1986.
9.

That based upon Dr. Curtis1 records, the obstetrical

care rendered to Lorrie Arnold was appropriate; he acted
responsibly and appropriately to the patient's complaints.
10.

That in any event, had an earlier diagnosis been made,

the outcome would have been the same as the infant could not have
been delivered sooner.
11.

That Dr. Curtis' diagnosis and treatment of the

colorectal cancer was timely and appropriate; and that based upon
my review of the medical records as previously referenced, the
allegations of medical negligence and malpractice against Dr.
Curtis are not supported by the documentation.
DATED this

h

/

day of November, 1990.

Gary H.-'' Johns o n / M . D .
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c ^ -

day of

November, 1990.

NOTARY
NOTARY IPUBLIC
PUBLIC
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at:
/7
My Commission Expires

W

Jb?V /Q&

3L-C

err

£/£

$Y/J3

